Abstract: It is a common belief that specific performance is the generally applied remedy for breach of contract in civil law countries.
Introduction
In the debate on whether specific performance or damages should be the preferred remedy for breach of contract, proponents of specific performance have found support in the alleged use of specific performance in civil law countries. Thus, Ulen 4 states (p. 361):
'… It is worth noting that in the civil law countries specific performance is the routine contract remedy… This is a difficult abandoned specific performance. In our view, these have to do with various costs of forcing the breaching party to perform actions. For Germany, we report a consensus among contract lawyers that while specific performance is enforced to a greater extent than in Denmark and France, it is very rarely sought by plaintiffs when actions must be performed. In the same vein, we provide evidence that plaintiffs in international disputes adjudicated under CISG-rules 5 almost never claim specific performance, even though specific performance is, with some exceptions, available under CISG. Most surprisingly perhaps, in our case-material specific performance has never been granted in contracts adjudicated under CISG. These observations lead us to suggest that the demand for specific performance is low, while at the same time, specific performance is costly to supply for the authorities.
This explains, in our view, that specific performance is used much less in the three civil law countries than commonly thought.
II. Structure
In the following section we define 'specific performance' and 'duties to act' as opposed to 'duties to give'. Then we turn to the practices of the three countries, i.e. the execution of claims for specific performance, the granting of specific performance by the courts, and the demand for specific performance by plaintiffs. We also list the reasons given in Denmark for limiting the enforcement of specific performance. Finally, we interpret our observations. III. Definition of 'specific performance' and 'action breach' Basically, when a party to a contract does not perform his part and the contract remedy is specific performance, the other party can claim performance in accordance with the contract. In the common law 5 UN Convention of the International Sales of Goods countries the primary remedy is 'damages', and the aggrieved party can only claim specific performance in certain situations.
Breach may be due to late (including no) delivery of the goods contracted for, in which case specific performance simply means to have the goods delivered. Or it may be due to the delivery of defective goods, in which case the buyer's claim for specific performance is a claim for repair or replacement 6 .
It may be worth stressing, to avoid confusion with some other usages of the term specific performance, that our definition of the term will incorporate two distinct notions: first, the contract must as mentioned be performed as stipulated in the contract if the aggrieved party requires it, the good must be delivered in natura or be brought to conform with the contract. And, second, the performance must be carried out by the supplier as a party to the contract, and not by a third party. Thus, the aggrieved party's right to make a cover purchase (buy the good or the service somewhere else) and be compensated for the price difference by the party in breach does not constitute specific performance in our terminology, it is a right to damages 78 .
We will distinguish, as is conventional, between duties to act and duties to give 9 . For example, we will argue that when a contract is breached and performance of the contract requires some actions to be undertaken, as when goods must be repaired or finished or produced, specific performance will not, as a practical matter, be available in Denmark. We will term these breaches 'action breaches'. This should be contrasted with the case where the goods already exist and only 6 If the seller cures the defect the buyer can then not require the price to be lowered or terminate the contract 7 It is worth noting that the term specific performance is sometimes used for the right to a cover purchase in civil law, which may partly account for the impression that specific performance is more widespread in civil law than in common law, see Beale. 8 Also, the restitution in natura known from tort claims will not fall under our analysis of specific performance; in these cases, performance is carried out by a third party, and the claim against the other party is monetary. On specific performance for tort claims, see Zervogianni. need to be handed over to the buyer. We do not claim that such claims are not enforceable, in fact they are: the enforcing authority (the bailiff) may enforce the right to have the goods handed over.
Let us now turn to the empirical part; our first observations concern the enforcement of specific performance in Denmark.
IV. The Enforcement of Specific Performance in Denmark
For action breaches, while contract law states that the plaintiff has the right to specific performance, the Danish Code of Civil Procedure virtually eliminates this right. Thus, there is in reality no enforcement of specific performance in Danish Law when actions need to be taken.
Let us first briefly describe the provisions of contract law and then turn to the Code of Civil Procedure.
For commercial contracts, Danish contract law lays down that a party whose contractual rights have been violated may choose between specific performance and damages 10 .
For consumer contracts, a distinct set of rules applies, in accordance with a EU-directive. For example, in the case of seller-breach, which usually occurs when a good is defective, both the seller and the buyer have a right to specific performance: generally speaking, the seller has the right to cure the defect and the buyer to have it cured.
In summary, the impression one is given from reading the provisions of Danish contract law is that specific performance plays a dominant role, both for commercial and for consumer contracts.
However, on closer inspection the Code of Procedure greatly restricts the number of cases for which specific performance will be enforced by the legal system. If the court grants a claim for specific performance, and the defaulting party still does not perform, the other party may ask the enforcing authority (in Danish: 'the foged', similar to the bailiff in common law) to enforce the claim. What the enforcing authority must do is provided in the Code of Procedure 11 , and here is the point:
The Code of Procedure stipulates that except in a specified class of cases 12 , 'the enforcing authority converts the plaintiff's claim into money damages' (Code of Procedure §533). The enforcing authority cannot, e.g. by imposing coercive fines, force the defendant to perform certain actions.
The specified set of cases §528-532 is the following: §528: where objects (already produced goods) simply need to be handed over to the plaintiff, including where a person is to be given access to real estate. §529: where a good can be procured from a third party; the enforcing authority can allow for a third party to perform and if the breaching party does not pay for this, the enforcing authority can seize his assets. § 530: where the only act to be performed is a signature on a document; the enforcing authority can sign for the defendant. § 531: where the act to be performed is the pledging of security; the enforcing authority can seize assets from the breaching party and pledge these as security. § 532: where the breaching party must be restrained from performing certain acts that are harmful to the other party.
Thus, the cases where the enforcing authority can enforce a claim for specific performance do not include those where actions need to be performed. This is reflected in practice. As a Danish enforcing agent said: "As soon as some act needs to be performed by the defendant, we convert" 13 .
One exception to the conclusion that actions (other than handing over objects, etc.) are not specifically enforceable is worth mentioning. If the judge has granted specific performance, and the defendant does not comply, the plaintiff may file a private, criminal suit against the defendant (according to §535 in the Code of Civil Procedure). Fines or even imprisonment may thereby be imposed on the defendant.
However, in recent times there seems to have been only one case of such a criminal suit (U 1991.239.SH) , and in that case the plaintiff did not prevail. To understand why such suits are virtually never filed, the important fact is that such a suit is not without cost to the individual plaintiff (even though if he wins the case some of his observable costs will be paid by the defendant). Since he is not awarded the fine, the incentive to file such suits is therefore limited.
Furthermore, if the plaintiff prevails in a criminal suit, the defendant can only be sanctioned once for not performing ( §535, footnote 3), so even if the defendant is sanctioned, he does not after the verdict have an incentive to perform. However, it cannot be concluded without a more thorough analysis, that the aggrieved party will never be rational to file a criminal suit for filing suit may make it optimal for the defendant to perform before the verdict is rendered. If he performs, the criminal trial must be stopped ( §535,2). This reaction by the defendant may in turn make it optimal for the plaintiff to file suit in the first place. However, if the defendant thinks he will prevail in the criminal trial, or simply is stubborn, the suit is likely to have a negative present value to the plaintiff, since the fine is not paid to him and does not in itself induce performance.
To conclude, the questionable incentive to file a criminal law suit and the virtual absence of such suits in actual fact, suggest in combination that such suits are not a realistic possibility. Thus, despite the theoretical possibility of a private, criminal law suit, we can conclude that specific performance is not in reality enforced against the will of the breaching party when actions need to be undertaken.
This raises the question whether claims for specific performance are nevertheless filed in front of the courts, despite the lack of ultimate enforcement.
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V. The Granting of Specific Performance by Danish Courts
In fact, the answer is that parties very rarely seek specific performance and that courts even more rarely grant it. There are, however, some exceptions that are worth addressing.
Let us first take the case of commercial contracts and then look at consumer contracts. For consumer contracts, however, specific performance does occur, even as a routine matter. Rights to have defects cured and to cure defects are respected in very many cases, although, as follows from what was noted above, this cannot be due to the ultimate enforcement by the enforcing authority of specific performance 16 . The reason is that if one party does not respect the other's claim to specific performance, his own (monetary) rights are diminished. Thus, if the seller does not cure the defect, the buyer obtains the right to a cover purchase (and to have the purchase price of the cover purchase reimbursed by the breaching seller) or to a reduction in price, or the right to terminate the contract (which implies a right to be paid back the purchase price and a right to have losses covered that are the result of the seller's breach). Similarly, if the consumer does not allow the seller to cure the defect when that is reasonable, the consumer's right to compensation is limited to the claim that would remain after the seller's cure. Thus, the essential point is that specific performance is enforced by monetary sanctions, and not enforced as such by the enforcing authority, at least not when actions need to be performed.
And we suspect that this is not very different from what occurs in the US under common law, where e.g. the duty to mitigate losses would tend to produce the same kind of behavior, although not stated as a rule of specific performance. Thus, also for consumer contracts 17 , there seems to be no substantial difference between civil and common law and in both cases, monetary sanctions in the end determine behavior, rather than the threat of ultimate execution of claims for specific performance.
Another exception should also be mentioned. For construction contracts, specific performance has in fact been granted and carried out by the breaching party. However, as a study by Lehmann Nielsen has revealed for the case of Denmark, in all such cases both parties to the contract preferred specific performance to a cover transaction (p.178). The following case is an example 18 : a group of entrepreneurs had agreed in a contract to repair in a specified fashion some houses which they had built and which suffered from defects that might in the future prove costly. After signing the contract, the entrepreneurs realized that the cost of repair was out of proportion to the gain.
Experts confirmed in court that the probability of future loss was very small in comparison to the expense of repair. Still, the Supreme Court voted by 3 to 2 to grant specific performance. This verdict could possibly have been enforced by the enforcing authority, since he could 17 When a consumer good that has been produced must be handed over to the buyer, there may be specific enforcement but in such cases, the consumer makes a cover purchase, and so also for such situations, the difference between civil law and common law is negligible. 18 It is actually published in UfR (1989, page 1039. It is the only such case in UfR.
have granted the buyers the right to contract for a third party to do the repair. This possibility is confirmed by the fact that the repairs actually were carried out by the entrepreneurs 19 ; they probably preferred this to a 'cover purchase' 20 . Thus, this case illustrates the same situation as that mentioned for consumer contracts: sometimes specific performance is carried out under the threat of monetary sanctions, in this case the threat of a cover purchase (that leads to a monetary claim against the breaching seller).
Our conclusion is that specific performance of actions is either simply not a relevant remedy or when it is relevant, as for consumer contracts and some construction contracts, the rule of specific performance yields the same result as that achieved by a damage rule under common law. The parties operate under what is in fact a damage regime, since only damages are ultimately enforced (while the threat of a private, criminal suit is not credible).
This being said, it should be stressed that for breaches other than action breaches, specific performance can be ultimately enforced and used in practice. For example, real estate sales are specifically enforced; if e.g. a seller of a house regrets the sale, the sale will generally be enforced if the buyer insists. Also, child custody cases are enforced. And there are cases where contractual obligations not to perform certain acts have been enforced, such as when a person violates a competition clause by leaving a firm to work for a competitor. In such cases the enforcing authority has sometimes issued an injunction. Thus, specific performance is in some circumstances an available remedy, but our concern here lies with action breaches, which are the kinds of breaches mainly (although not exclusively) addressed in the economic literature on efficient breach.
VI. The Enforcement of Specific Performance in Germany and France
As in the case of Denmark, in both Germany and France the nonbreaching party generally has the right to choose between specific performance and damages. In this respect, the three countries are similar. The question to be raised here is whether specific performance, if granted by the courts, will ultimately be executed in Germany and France.
In the case of Germany, when it comes to the execution of claims of specific performance, as in Danish (and French, see below 21 ) law, a basic distinction is drawn between the situation where the seller should take some positive action and where he just has to hand over the goods (see Zweigert & Kötz 1998, pp. 470) . In the latter case, there will be enforcement if it can be done by the bailiff, if necessary with the help of the police, taking possession of the goods. In the former case, a further distinction is made as to whether the act could equally well be performed by someone else (i.e. is 'vertretbar', see § 887 in the Code of Civil Procedure, Zivilprocessordnung, ZPO). If substitute performance is available (at reasonable cost), a claim for specific performance will not be executed, but the plaintiff may make the cover purchase and the bailiff (the Gerichtsvollzieher) will then execute the monetary claim in value equal to the cover purchase. Thus, when substitute performance is available, the claim is ultimately, if not already at the court-level 22 , converted to a money claim. However, if substitute performance is not available, the breaching party can for such acts be threatened with a fine or imprisonment if he refuses to deliver ( § 888 in ZPO). This is a major difference to Danish law; this was the element of the Danish Code of Civil Procedure that was changed in 1916. There are, however, further exceptions in the German law: performance must not depend on the seller's inspiration 21 It is a distinction which goes back to Roman law, see Dawson (1959) . 22 The most likely outcome is that the non-breaching party makes a cover purchase and sues for damages in the amount of the cover purchase which is then granted in accordance with the rule of expectations damages.
or special effort 23 but rather must have a more routine character.
Furthermore, § 888 describes some other situations where the penal pressure is also not available, notably in employment contracts 24 .
For the case of France, although the Code Civil provides the right to claim specific performance, this principle is modified in Art. II42, that prohibits any judgment obliging the seller to act in a particular way.
The idea behind Art. II42 is that citizens are 'free' and should not be forced into a certain course of action by the State, unless important public interests are at stake. However, according to Zweigert & Kötz (1998, p. 475) , how far this principle is carried in practice is unclear.
As mentioned above, the French Code Civil makes a basic distinction between an 'obligation de faire' (to do) and an 'obligation de donner' (to give), as do the German and the Danish. The case of 'donner' (giving) follows the same rules as in Denmark and Germany. For the case of 'faire' the rules are formally also quite similar to the Danish and German rules. Thus, the bailiff can execute a money claim arising from a cover purchase. There is, however, a difference in that French courts administer a special system of fines (astreintes) that are paid from the breaching party to the conforming party, if the breaching party chooses not to perform. However, the enforcement of the system of 'astreintes' is not strong. Zweigert & Kötz put it in the following terms (p.475): 'We may sum up by saying that French law generally admits the issuance of judgments for performance in kind but enforces them in a very grudging manner'. 25 
VII. On the Use of Specific Performance in Germany and France
For the case of Germany and France, no databases were available to us; we rely instead on the accounts by legal experts. We will emphasize that one finds a consensus in the comparative literature on contract breach that damages is by far the dominant form of relief for actions breaches in both Germany and France.
Actually, this is not a new insight. Ernst Rabel stated in `Recht des
Warenkaufs ' (1936) However, some of the cases that he mentions do not involve (complex) actions to be taken, such as where a company is forced to render its accounts (p. 134, a case from 1933). However, Remien does mention cases that involve actions (as opposed to the handing over of objects or children). One case from 1897 concerns the delivery of electricity to a hotel, and another case from 1985 concerns the reparation of a computer by the deliverer. Still, the impression remains that specific performance is rarely used, especially in commercial transactions, and this is also the conclusion reached by Kötz and Zweigert (p. 484):
'In Germany… where the claim to performance is regarded as the primary legal remedy, it does not in practice have anything like the significance originally attached to it, since whenever the failure to receive the promised performance can be made good by the payment of money, commercial men prefer to claim damages rather than risk wasting time and money on a claim for performance whose execution may not produce satisfactory results'.
We do not want to overstate our case: As in common law, specific performance is sometimes sought, granted and executed also in Germany and France. Thus, in Beale's account of the French and the German systems, one finds cases from both Germany and France where specific performance is applied, particularly for construction contracts and for the delivery of already existing goods (see Beale, . For construction contracts, the possibility of a cover purchase may, as in Denmark, induce specific performance performance, and when a cover purchases is possible, the difference to common law may not be large, since cover purchases may also be made for construction contracts in common law (see Beale, p. 685) .
For the delivery of existing goods, however, it is conceivable that a real difference exists. In England, enforcement in natura is only carried out for unique or unobtainable goods 28 , while specific performance is generally available in France and Germany (and Denmark). We do not know whether this difference matters in practice 29 .
VIII. Specific Performance in Cases Adjudicated under CISG
The CISG (United Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods) was the first major international sales law accepted by a large number of nations. CISG is now ratified by more than 55 countries around the world including leading trade nations.
Article 46 (1) provides that the buyer may require performance by the seller of his obligations 30 . However under article 28, a court is not bound to enter a judgment for specific performance unless the court would do so under its own law in respect of similar contracts of sale.
This means that the courts of the common law countries such as USA, Canada, and Australia are not bound to grant specific performance.
Still, to the extent that specific performance is available in civil law countries we would expect to find some cases of contracts adjudicated under CISG, that involve specific performance.
To see whether such cases exist we obtained date from the private UNILEX database and the following databases available on the http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/960531s1.html clear 33 . The tribunal further stated that even if CISG was applied the tribunal "fails to see how specific performance could be an appropriate remedy for buyers in this case". The tribunal pointed to the problems associated with the ultimate enforcement of specific performance of contracts in Russia for the next eight or ten years.
The conclusion is clear. Even though specific performance is a remedy available in many of the CISG-cases we have studied, it is virtually never claimed and in our material literally never granted 34 .
We will now turn to answering the question why specific performance is either not enforced, or reluctantly enforced, or if enforced, rarely claimed for action breaches in the countries we have investigated. The hypotheses, which we will try to substantiate in the following, is that specific enforcement is more costly for the authorities to enforce than damages, and that plaintiffs generally do not demand this remedy.
Together, these hypotheses can explain why the authorities have not found it worthwhile to enforce specific performance and why, even when specific performance is enforced, it is not in demand, as seems to come out of the study of the situation in Germany.
First let us inquire directly into the reasons provided by decisionmakers and experts for not enforcing specific performance, and let us concentrate here mainly on the case of Denmark.
IX. Why Was Specific Performance of Actions Abandoned in Denmark?
The law of 1842 prescribed that if the breaching party did not perform according to a court-decree stating specific performance, he could be sanctioned to periodic fines or imprisonment. These sanctions were `The fact that there has been no criticism (of the lack of specific performance, ed) and that the need for stricter enforcement in this area has not been expressed, has been decisive for the committee…'.
One may wonder how the committee knew that demand was low when specific performance was in fact not available in Denmark (this would explain the low demand), but the committee also noted the absence of complaints about the lack of enforcement.
To briefly sum up, specific performance has some unattractive features: it entails using the public monopoly on the use of force to make people undertake certain actions, it involves the risk of hold-up against the breaching party, and it is administratively expensive.
These costs have been judged not to be worth the benefits, that have seemed not to be large in view of the small demand for specific performance on the part of plaintiffs.
It is interesting to note that the exact same reasons have been given by common law judges for only enforcing specific performance under certain circumstances, see e.g. 38 See Torsten Iversen (2000) 2. We have also noted that specific performance seems generally speaking not to be an attractive remedy for plaintiffs; usually a cover purchase is the more attractive remedy.
3. On the other hand, we have not shown that specific performance could not be made to function. Naturally, the low demand for specific performance is relative to the way specific performance is enforced. If it were very strongly enforced such that breaching parties would fear the remedy and therefore immediately would perform the contract if the other party (rightly) required it, then demand for it might be high on the part of plaintiffs, and the advantages claimed for the remedy might then be realized. We have not shown this argument to be incorrect. Our suspicion is that it would be quite costly to run a system of coercive fines that would grant the non-breaching enough bargaining power during the stages of enforcement to make specific performance an attractive remedy compared with damages.
4. Our observations suggest that the cover purchase is empirically more relevant than specific performance; cover purchases are routinely enforced and sought by plaintiffs in all of the three countries, and also under CISG. Also, cover purchases involve some of the same efficiency issues as specific performance when the seller has made specific investments and can supply the good at lower cost than alternative suppliers. A theoretical discussion of the extent to which cover purchases are allowed 39 would hence seem more relevant than a continued discussion concerning specific performance. 
